With the advancement of digital technologies, streaming platforms, which include popular examples like YouTube and Spotify, have established themselves as the primary means of consuming musical and audiovisual content. This reality reignites legal debates about the limits of copyright transfers.
Although not an isolated case, the recent legal dispute between singer Leonardo and Sony Music highlighted relevant concerns regarding the extent of rights granted by the author of a work and the longevity of these rights over time, especially in the face of new forms of exploitation, such as streaming.
In this case, Leonardo, as the author, legally challenged the validity of the contract signed in 1998 with Sony Music regarding the possibility of distributing his musical catalog on streaming platforms, arguing that the contractual clause determining the extent of Sony Music’s use of the work does not expressly include distribution via streaming.
The controversy revolves around the restrictive interpretation given to legal agreements (including contracts) that regulate copyrights. One cannot presume what was not clearly and expressly agreed upon, which could lead to the understanding that current forms of exploitation were not foreseen in past agreements and, therefore, were not authorized by the author. However, while the obligation to comply with the validity criteria of the transfer (e.g., the contract must be in writing, specify authorized forms of use, etc.) is undeniable, it is crucial that the analysis considers the technological context in which the contract was signed (in 1998, when Leonardo signed the contract, Spotify—for example—was still 10 years away from being launched).
The main point of tension, both in this case and in similar ones, is the validity of contracts signed before the internet became the dominant means of content distribution. Strictly speaking, the music industry argues that streaming is merely an extension of traditional forms of performance or distribution, which legitimizes its use under existing contractual clauses. On the other hand, authors argue that it is an entirely new medium, requiring specific authorization and, in certain cases, renegotiation of contractual remuneration.
The discussion about the need for specific authorization for the use of musical works on digital platforms has already been analyzed by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) in the judgment of Special Appeal No. 1,559,264/RJ. On that occasion, the Court recognized that streaming could fall under the uses provided for in Article 29 of the Copyright Law. However, it emphasized that this type of exploitation requires prior and express consent from the rights holder, in observance of the principle of restrictive interpretation.
More than a specific conflict between particular parties, discussions like this reveal a structural issue: the urgent need to review contracts involving the transfer of copyrights, regardless of the sector—be it the music industry, the increasingly digitized educational sector, journalistic outlets, or any other that uses and exploits content protected by copyright. Given the speed at which new technologies and distribution formats emerge—especially in the digital environment—it becomes essential for these contractual instruments to clearly and comprehensively specify authorized forms of use. This is because omissions, which may seem commercially beneficial by granting broad permission to exploit content, can lead to legal uncertainty, demands for compensation for moral and material rights, as well as costly and prolonged disputes in the judiciary.
